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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] A local newspaper1 reports that your state recently passed a law 
prohibiting citizens from “writ[ing] or send[ing] a text message while 
operating a motor vehicle.”2  Armed with the knowledge of the texting 
ban, you, being a reasonable citizen, are likely to proceed in one of at least 
three ways, each of which exposes the statute’s fundamental flaws. 
 
[2] Scenario 1: You decide text messaging is too important to your 
social life to refrain from sending text messages while driving, so you 
                                                
∗ J.D., 2010, University of Baltimore School of Law.  Law Clerk to the Hon. Glenn T. 
Harrell Jr., Court of Appeals of Maryland; 2010-11.  The views expressed in this Article 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hon. Glenn T. Harrell Jr., or the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland.  
 
1 See Julie Scharper, Road Hazard, BALT. SUN, Sept. 27, 2009, at 1A, available at 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-09-27/news/0909260153_1_sending-text-text-
messaging-texting-while-driving.   
 
2 Delegate John Arnick Electronic Communications Traffic Safety Act, MD. CODE ANN., 
TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
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ignore the new ban and engage in intense text messaging conversations 
while operating a motor vehicle.3  One day a police officer driving 
alongside your vehicle observes you writing and sending a text message.4  
The officer pulls your vehicle over and writes you a $500 ticket.5   
 
[3] But you hire a savvy defense attorney to defend you in this matter, 
and he does not believe the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
you were writing or sending a text message while operating a motor 
vehicle.6  During cross-examination of the officer, the following colloquy 
ensues: 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] You testified that you stopped my 
client because he was writing and sending a text message, 
is that correct? 
 
[OFFICER] That is correct. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] And you are certain he was 
writing and sending a text message because you witnessed 
it occur, is that correct? 
 
                                                
3 See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of talking and 
text messaging while driving); Driving While Distracted – Cell Phone Ban, NATIONWIDE, 
12 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.nationwide.com/pdf/NW-Cell-Phone-Ban-final-
survey-results.pdf [hereinafter Driving While Distracted] (reporting that only forty-one 
percent of respondents said their behavior would change if cell phone usage were 
restricted by law).   
 
4 See generally infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the distinction between primary and 
secondary offenses). 
 
5 See TRANSP. § 27-101(b) (“[A]ny person convicted of a misdemeanor for the violation 
of any of the provisions of the Maryland Vehicle Law is subject to a fine of not more than 
$500.”).   
 
6 See, e.g., State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 725 (Md. 1981) (“[D]ue process requirements 
mandate that a criminal conviction not be obtained if the evidence does not reasonably 
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).   
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[OFFICER] Yes, I witnessed him write and send a text 
message. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] But, you were not able to 
physically view the screen of the cell phone, were you, 
Officer? 
 
[OFFICER] No, I could not physically see the screen. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Then you cannot be sure that my 
client was not, in fact, posting something to his Facebook7 
wall, correct? 
 
[OFFICER] I guess he could have been. 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] And you cannot be sure that he 
was not posting a message on Twitter,8 can you? 
 
[OFFICER] No, I cannot say that for sure. 
 
[4] Your attorney argues that the term text message in the statute does 
not encompass sending messages through social-media sites such as 
Facebook or Twitter.9  Because the officer is the prosecution’s only 
witness, the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you were, 
as the statute requires, sending a text message while operating a motor 
                                                
7 “Facebook is a versatile social networking Web site, allowing users to post messages on 
their friends' walls, share photos and video files, send email and instant messages.”  Sajai 
Singh, Anti-Social Networking: Learning the Art of Making Enemies in Web 2.0, 12 J. 
INTERNET L. 3, 3 (Dec. 2008).   
 
8 “Twitter is a free social networking and micro-blogging service that lets users send 
messages called ‘tweets.’  Tweets are messages that can contain up to 100 characters.  
Once posted, tweets are sent to the people (known as followers) who subscribe to a 
particular person's messages.”  Susan W. Brenner, Internet Law in the Courts, 13 J. 
INTERNET L. 16, 16 (Dec. 2009). 
 
9 See infra note 13.  While the statute essentially defines “text messaging device” as a cell 
phone, neither the statute nor its legislative history give any guidance as to what 
constitutes a “text message.”  See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw 
through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
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vehicle.10  Based on these grounds, your attorney moves for, and is 
granted, a judgment of acquittal.11  
  
[5] Scenario 2: You decide to abide by the law, but your understanding 
of the term text message is limited to its colloquial use: a short message 
sent from one cell phone to another, or an SMS message.12  As such, you 
do not believe posting messages on Facebook or Twitter constitutes 
sending text messages, and you continue posting such messages while 
driving.13  One day, a police officer observes you engaging in this activity 
and he initiates a traffic stop during which he issues you a $500 ticket for 
violating the State’s text messaging ban.14  This time, the savvy defense 
attorney is unable to help you and the judge explains that because you sent 
a message15 comprised of text you are guilty of violating the statute.  
 
[6] Scenario 3: You decide to abide by the ban and you reason that 
because posting on Facebook and Twitter involves the sending of 
                                                
10 MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
 
11 See MD. R. 4-324(a) (“A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more 
counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense which by law is divided into degrees, at 
the close of the evidence offered by the State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all the 
evidence.”).   
 
12 “Text messaging is the sending of short messages over a cellular phone network, 
typically by means of a short message service (SMS).”  Steven Goode, The Admissibility 
of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 16 n.66 (2009).  Such SMS messages are 
“transmitted to the recipient immediately, or they may be stored and forwarded later if a 
recipient's phone was off when the message was initiated.”  Id. 
 
13 See Editorial, TXT U L8R; TIME 2 DRIVE, BALT. SUN, Sept. 29, 2009, at 12A, 
available at http://www.saferoads.org/txt-u-l8r-time-2-drive (last visited July 17, 2010) 
(“It's not even absolutely certain that the law would apply to posting updates on 
Facebook or Twitter - or even sending an e-mail on your BlackBerry.”). 
 
14 See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 27-101(b) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
 
15 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “message” as “[a] written or oral communication, 
often sent through a messenger or other agent, or electronically. . . .”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1080 (9th ed. 2009). 
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messages comprised of text, you may no longer post items on social-
networking sites while driving.   
 
[7] Scenarios 1 and 2 illustrate the first major flaw associated with 
statutes that prohibit citizens from text messaging while driving: absent a 
clear definition of what constitutes a text message, prosecution and 
enforcement of the text messaging ban will be impossible at worst and 
inconsistent at best.16  Because the statute does not put citizens on fair 
notice as to what activity is criminal, and because it does not provide law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges with a meaningful standard 
to apply in prosecuting and enforcing the law, there is a strong argument 
that the statute is void for vagueness.17 
 
[8] Scenario 3 presents a classic example of a chilling effect on 
protected expression.18  That is, assuming the legislature intended the 
statute to prohibit only the use of SMS-like text messages,19 the statute’s 
failure to define text message might have the collateral effect of making 
reasonable citizens more reluctant to engage in non-proscribed forms of 
communications, such as posting on social media websites.20  While 
legislatures ostensibly have the power to restrict the right to send text 
messages out of concern for driver-safety, the chilling effect stemming 
from the statute’s ambiguity raises a First Amendment issue: the 
                                                
16 See Andrew Thomason, Lawmakers Want To Keep Drivers' Eyes on Road, ST. J.-REG., 
Feb. 17, 2009, at LOCAL, available at http://www.sj-r.com/news/x426328416/ 
Lawmakers-focus-on-legislation-to-fine-distracted-drivers-more (“[E]nforcement of a 
cell phone or text messaging ban [is] much more difficult than pulling someone over for 
applying mascara while driving.”). 
 
17 See infra Part IV.B. 
 
18 See generally Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 
(1969) (discussing the operation and parameters of the “chilling effect” in constitutional 
law). 
 
19 See infra Part IV.B.2.ii (discussing the common understanding of the term “text 
message”). 
 
20 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (describing the “chilling effect” as 
“the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual 
the more reluctant to exercise it.”).  
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potentially unconstitutional curtailment of constitutionally protected 
speech.21  
 
[9] The above exercise is not merely academic.  To date, at least 
twenty-one states have enacted legislation limiting or forbidding the 
sending of text messages while driving.22  In fact, one commentator 
dubbed the issue “the hottest safety issue in the states right now . . . .”23   
 
[10] Generally, this Article deals with Maryland’s recently enacted text 
messaging ban, which prohibits citizens from “writ[ing] or send[ing] a text 
message while operating a motor vehicle.”24  More specifically, this 
Article first discusses the effects cell-phone use and text messaging have 
on driver behavior, with a focus on the ills the Maryland legislature sought 
to remedy by enacting the statute.  Second, this Article details the 
Maryland legislature’s attempts to combat distracted driving, including an 
overview of legislative bills and their legislative history.  Third, this 
Article argues that Maryland’s 2009 ban – the Delegate John Arnick 
Electronic Communications Traffic Safety Act – is at best difficult or 
impossible to enforce and at worst unconstitutional.  Finally, this Article 
discusses legislation recently introduced in the Maryland legislature that 
would rectify many of the issues raised regarding the prohibition against 
text messaging while driving. 
                                                
21 See id. at 157. 
 
22 For a state-by-state breakdown of such text-messaging legislation, see State Cell Phone 
Use and Texting While Driving Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N (July 2010), 
available at http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/ laws/cellphone_laws.html.  On the 
federal level, in October 2009, President Barack Obama signed an order prohibiting 
federal employees from texting in state-provided cars.  Matt Richtel, Bills to Curb 
Distracted Driving Gain Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/ technology/02distracted.html.  While the federal 
government has largely avoided enacting distracted driving legislation, there are bills 
under consideration that “could condition the receipt of highway funds on states’ 
adoption of distracted driving restrictions in bills currently under consideration.”  Peter 
D. Jacobson & Lawrence O. Gostin, Reducing Distracted Driving, Regulation and 
Education to Avert Traffic Injuries and Fatalities, 303 JAMA 1419, 1419 (2010). 
 
23 Richtel, supra note 22.   
 
24 MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
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II.  THE EFFECTS OF TEXT MESSAGING ON DRIVER BEHAVIOR 
 
[11] In the past twenty-five years, there have been more than one 
million fatalities as a result of motor vehicle crashes, with 37,261 deaths 
occurring in 2008 alone.25  In fact, motor vehicle crashes are the number 
one killer of individuals between fifteen and twenty years of age.26  A 
major factor contributing to this unsettling number is driver inattention.27  
Estimates reveal that over twenty percent of motor vehicle crashes in 2009 
involved distracted driving.28  As such, it is no surprise that for over fifty 
years researchers have sought to determine a link between motor vehicle 
crashes and various distracting behaviors.29   
 
[12] Technological growth has transformed the cell phone from an item 
used only in special circumstances into “a personal necessity, [that has] 
become a staple of American life.”30  And with cell phone subscriptions 
likely exceeding the 4 billion mark worldwide, it comes as no surprise that 
cell phone use is one of the leading distractions leading to driver 
                                                
25 Safety Culture, AAA FOUND. (July 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/2009TSCIndexFS.pdf. 
 
26 Bus. Wire, Survey Shows Teens’ Risky Driving Habits Include Text Messaging Behind 
the Wheel, ALL BUS. (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/ 
services/business-services/4518957-1.html.   
 
27 See D.L. Hendricks et al., The Relative Frequency of Unsafe Driving Acts in Serious 
Traffic Crashes, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2 (Jan. 2001), available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/research/UDAshortrpt/UDAsummtechrept.pdf 
(noting that driver inattention was a factor in 22.7% of crashes examined). 
 
28 Jacobson, supra note 22, at 1419. 
 
29 See, e.g., I.D. Brown & E.C. Poulton, Measuring the Spare “Mental Capacity” of Car 
Drivers by a Subsidiary Task, 4 ERGONOMICS 35, 35 (1961).  See generally S.L. 
Chisholm et al., The Effects of Practice with MP3 Players on Driving Performance, 40 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 704 (2007); Jacobson, supra note 22, at 1419-20 
(2010) (detailing the risks of distracted driving, distracted driving laws and regulations, 
automakers’ design changes, and policies to reduce distracted driving).  
  
30 Shannon L. Noder, Talking and Texting While Driving: A Look at Regulating Cell 
Phone Use Behind the Wheel, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 237, 240 (2009).   
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inattention.31  In 2007, when cell phone use was much less prevalent than 
it is today, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(“NHTSA”) estimated that at any given time six percent of drivers on the 
road were using their cell phones.32  The NHTSA study and other similar 
studies linking cell phone use to motor vehicle accidents likely constitute 
the driving force behind state legislation prohibiting text messaging while 
operating a motor vehicle.33  
 
[13] Researchers have found that using a cell phone while driving 
greatly slows a driver’s reaction time34 and increases a driver’s risk of 
crashing.35  In fact, statistical analyses have revealed that using a cell 
                                                
31 See Number of Cell Phone Subscribers To Hit 4 Billion This Year, UN Says, UNITED 
NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. (Sept. 26, 2008), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.phpURL_ID=27530&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SE
CTION=201.html; infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
 
32 Traffic Safety Facts: Driver Electronic Device Use in 2007, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., at 1, available at www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810963.pdf; see 
Overview of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Driver Distraction 
Program, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., at 4, available at 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/distracted_ driving/pdf/811299.pdf; Annie Barret 
Wallin, Cell Phones Pose a Distraction to Drivers but Legislative Ban Is Not the Answer, 
98 KY. L.J. 177, 178 (2009) (noting that, in 2004, the figure was approximately eight 
percent). 
 
33 See generally Karel A. Brookhuis et al., The Effects of Mobile Telephoning on Driving 
Performance, 23 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 309 (1991); Noder, supra note 30, 
at 242-43 (explaining why statistics purporting to show the incidence of motor vehicle 
crashes attributable to cellular phone use might be inaccurately low).   
 
34 See Jeff K. Caird et al., A Meta-Analysis of Driving Performance and Crash Risk 
Associated With the Use of Cellular Telephones While Driving, 480-81 (2005), available 
at www.cellphonefreedriving.ca/media/70_Caird_ Meta_analysis.pdf; William J. Horrey 
& Christopher D. Wickens, Examining the Impact of Cell Phone Conversations on 
Driving Using Meta-Analytic Techniques, 48 HUM. FACTORS 196, 202-03 (2006), 
available at http://mysite.verizon.net/ horrey/papers/Horrey_HF2006meta.pdf. 
 
35 Donald A. Redelmeier & Robert J. Tibshirani, Association Between Cellular-
Telephone Calls and Motor Vehicle Collisions, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 453, 456 (1997); 
see Wallin, supra note 32, at 184-86 (outlining arguments in favor of handheld cell phone 
bans). 
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phone while driving may quadruple the risk of crashing.36  One study 
found that the act of dialing a cell phone increased the likelihood of a 
crash nearly three-fold, while merely talking on a cell phone increase the 
risk by about thirty percent.37  But despite the volume of research 
conducted regarding cell phone use while driving, “there is a significant 
gap in the research literature, namely the effects of text messaging on 
driving.”38 
 
[14] The use of texting as a form of communication is growing 
exponentially.39  In 2008, nearly 600 billion text messages were sent, 
almost four times the amount sent in 2006.40  Demographically, texting is 
most prevalent among younger people, and studies indicate that sixty-six 
percent of individuals aged eighteen to twenty-four report that they text 
while driving, whereas only sixteen percent of all cell phone owners 
reported that they text while driving.41  Due to the prevalence of texting 
                                                
36 Suzanne P. McEvoy et al., Role of Mobile Phones in Motor Vehicle Crashes Resulting 
in Hospital Attendance: A Case-Crossover Study, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 428, 430 (2005), 
available at http://www.bmj.com/content/331/7514/428.full.pdf+html?sid=6b16406b-
aedc-4d7c-ae0f-9bc5d1109898. 
 
37 See S.G. Klauer et al., The Impact of Driver Inattention on Near-Crash/Crash Risk: An 
Analysis Using the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study Data, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., 33 (2006), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/DOT/NHTSA/ 
NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crash%20Avoidance/Driver%20Distraction/810594.pdf.  
However, researchers found that the increase in crash risk from merely talking on or 
listening to a handheld device was not statistically significant. Id. at 32. 
 
38 Nick Reed & R. Robbins, The Effect of Text Messaging On Driver Behaviour, A 
Simulator Study, RAC FOUND., viii (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.racfoundation. 
org/assets/rac_foundation/content/downloadables/texting %20whilst%20driving%20-
%20trl%20-%20180908%20-%20report.pdf.  
 
39 See Jennifer Davison, Play It Safe, Texting While Driving Has GTG!!!, AM. NAT’L 
(May 7, 2009), available at http://www.anpac.com/safety/texting/Play%20it% 
20Safe%20texting%2003-09.pdf. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Zogby Poll: 83% Say Texting While Driving Should Be Illegal, ZOGBY (June 5, 2007), 
available at http://www.zogby.com/News/ReadNews.cfm?ID=1323 [hereinafter Zogby 
Poll].  In another study, forty-five percent of respondents admitted to texting while 
driving.  Reed, supra note 38, at 3.   
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while driving, researchers have recently begun examining the relationship 
between such texting and motor vehicle crashes.42  
 
A. Early Research 
 
[15] Despite the recent emergence of studies researching the effects of 
texting while driving, most research to date has either “focused on verbal 
communication at best, or at worst conflated text messaging with verbal 
communication under vague labels such as ‘mobile phone use.’”43  A 2004 
study found – albeit in a sample of only ten drivers – that receiving a text 
message while driving increased braking response times.44  Additionally, a 
2006 study, in which researchers asked young drivers in a simulator to 
send and receive text messages, found participants spent about forty 
percent of the time looking away from the road, were less consistent in 
maintaining position in their lane, and frequently failed to see signs 
instructing them to change lanes.45  However, until the 2008 Transport 
Research Laboratory study,46 no study differentiated between sending and 
receiving text messages, nor did any research “describe any performance 
differences resulting from experience of texting.”47 
 
[16] Yet, while the public may be unaware of the research evidencing 
the inherent dangers involved with texting while driving, it is well aware 
                                                
42 See Noder, supra note 30, at 262 (detailing the case of a train accident that killed over 
twenty-five people, caused in part by an operator who was texting at the time of the 
crash).   
 
43 Reed, supra note 38, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 
44 Albert Kircher et al., Mobile Telephone Simulator Study, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, 113-
16 (2004), available at http://www.nsc.org/safety_road/Distracted_Driving/Documents/ 
Mobile%20Telephone%20Simulator%20Study.pdf. 
 
45 Simon Hosking et al., The Effects of Text Messaging on Young Notice Driver 
Performance, MONASH U., 20-21 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.monash.edu.au/ 
muarc/reports/muarc246.pdf. 
 
46 See infra part II.B. 
 
47 Reed, supra note 38, at 4. 
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of the risks.48  An AAA Foundation poll found that over ninety-four 
percent of drivers consider it unacceptable to send text messages or e-
mails while driving, with almost eighty-seven percent of respondents 
considering such activity a “very serious threat to their personal safety.”49  
Further, numerous surveys show that over eighty percent of drivers favor 
legislation outlawing texting while driving.50 
 
B. September 2008 Transport Research Laboratory Study 
 
[17] In this author’s opinion, the largest and most comprehensive study 
evaluating the effects of texting on driver behavior is the Transport 
Research Laboratory (“TRL”) study published in September 2008.51  The 
TRL study was designed “to assess the impact of text messaging on driver 
performance, and the attitudes and beliefs that surrounded the activity in 
the 17-25 age category.”52  The study consisted of seventeen participants 
who completed the study using a driving simulator.53  Each participant 
completed a distraction-free drive as well as a drive in which researchers 
instructed them to read a received message, compose and send a message, 
or ignore an incoming message.54  Researchers hypothesized that “when 
writing/reading text messages, drivers would display increased reaction 
times, poorer care following ability, poorer lateral lane control, and 
reduced speed.”55  Researchers also predicted that “reductions in drivers’ 
                                                
48 Id. at 35-36. 
 
49 Safety Culture, supra note 25.   
 
50 Driving While Distracted, supra note 3, at 4; Zogby Poll, supra note 41. 
 
51 See generally Reed, supra note 38. 
 
52 Id. at viii. Choosing the demographic of seventeen to twenty-five year-olds makes 
sense, as it is this age group that tends to text the most. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
 
53 Reed, supra note 38, at viii. 
 
54 Id. 
 
55 Id. 
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performance [would] be greater when writing a text message than when 
reading a text message.”56 
 
[18] The study’s results overwhelmingly confirmed the researchers’ 
hypotheses.57  Primarily, the study confirmed that “[r]eaction times to 
(task-unrelated) trigger stimuli tended to be higher when reading or 
writing a [text] message.”58  Furthermore, the study discovered a disparity 
in impairment between composing and reading text messages, namely that 
“[w]riting text messages created a significantly greater impairment than 
reading text messages.”59  Finally, the researchers observed that drivers, 
while texting, “were less able to maintain a constant distance behind a lead 
vehicle and showed increased variability in lateral lane position when 
following that vehicle.”60 
 
[19] The results of the TRL study are not merely academic.  As the 
researchers point out, “[t]he failure to detect hazards, increased response 
times to hazards, and exposure time to that risk have clear implications for 
safety.”61  At normal highway speeds, it might take a driver as much as a 
mile to complete the composition and sending of a text message.62  The 
difference in reaction time between sending and not sending a text 
message could increase the distance required to stop a vehicle by 
                                                
56 Id. 
 
57 Id. at 16-28. 
 
58 Reed, supra note 38, at viii.  For detailed reaction-time findings and charts, see id. at 
16-17. 
 
59 Id. at viii.  This distinction is logical, considering that one composing a text message, 
as opposed to one merely reading a text message, “must consider the text to be written 
and interact with the phone to compose the message.”  Id. at ix. 
 
60 Id. at ix.   
 
61 Id. at viii. 
 
62 Reed, supra note 38, at viii.  It took participants in the TRL study an average of sixty-
three seconds to compose and send a text message while driving.  Id. at 28; see Jacobson, 
supra note 22, at 1419 (“[W]hen texting, drivers take their eyes off the road for 4.6 of 6 
seconds.”).   
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approximately three car lengths, a distance that “could easily make the 
difference between causing and avoiding an accident or between a fatal 
and non-fatal collision.”63  Additionally, the poor control over lateral 
position and reaction times that TRL researchers found “would increase 
the likelihood of collision dramatically.”64  Thus, it is clear the dangers the 
Maryland legislature sought to rectify in passing the Delegate John Arnick 
Electronic Communications Traffic Safety Act are serious – dangers the 
TRL researchers determined were “greater than [those] caused by alcohol 
consumption to the legal limit for driving [and the use of] cannabis.”65 
 
III.  MARYLAND’S LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO OUTLAW TEXTING 
 
[20] While the issue of banning cell phone use while driving has gained 
attention in the last decade, the first legislative attempt to ban text 
messaging while driving was introduced in the Maryland Legislature in 
2008.66  
 
A. Legislation On the Books 
 
[21] Although the first legislative attempt to expressly outlaw text 
messaging while driving was introduced in 2008, the legislation arguably 
“seeks to prohibit [acts] already criminal under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 
                                                
63 Reed, supra note 38, at viii. 
 
64 Id. at ix. 
 
65 Id.; see Davison, supra note 39 (“‘Texting while driving is more dangerous than 
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol.’”).  The TRL study indicated that, 
whereas reaction times for users of alcohol and marijuana were delayed by twelve and 
twenty-one percent, respectively, the reaction times of those texting were delayed by 
thirty-five percent.  See Reed, supra note 38, at 46. 
 
66 See Nicole Fuller, Limits Eyed on Cell Use in Cars, Lawmakers Again Try to Bar 
Hand-Held Phone Use, Texting While Driving in Md., BALT. SUN, Jan. 22, 2008, at 1A, 
available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-01-22/news/0801220052_1_cell-
phone-while-driving-text-messaging.  The first piece of legislation seeking to outlaw 
cellular phone use while driving was introduced in 1999 by Delegate John S. Arnick, the 
individual for whom the current legislation is named.  Id. 
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21-901.1.”67  Section 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article provides that 
“[a] person is guilty of negligent driving if he drives a motor vehicle in a 
careless or imprudent manner that endangers any property or the life or 
person of any individual.”68  Conceivably, one who employs one or both 
of his hands and takes his eyes off the road for the better part of a minute – 
as the TRL study found – to send a text message, is likely driving in a 
“careless” and “imprudent” manner that potentially endangers other 
motorists.69  As such, it has been reasoned that new prohibitions against 
using cell phones and text messaging while driving are superfluous, and 
law enforcement agencies should use the tools already in place.70 
 
B. 2008 Legislation 
 
[22] House Bill 380 of the 2008 Regular Session sought to add § 21-
1124.1 to the Transportation Article, providing that “[a] person may not 
use a text messaging device to write, send, or read a text message while 
operating a motor vehicle.”71  This legislation was originally part of a 
larger Senate Bill that barely passed in the Senate before being referred to 
                                                
67 State of Md. Office of the Pub. Defender, Position on Proposed Legislation – HB 380 
(Feb. 12, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Position on Proposed Legislation]. 
 
68 MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-901.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
 
69 Reed, supra note 38, at 44. 
 
70 Wallin, supra note 32, at 196 (advocating the use of current reckless driving statutes 
instead of enacting specific text message legislation), 200 (quoting a former state trooper 
as saying that “[w]hen I was a trooper I would pull motorists over for reckless driving 
and find out they were putting on makeup or reading a road map . . . .I didn’t need a 
special law to charge them; we already outlaw reckless driving.”); Cell Phone Bill Back 
on Table, SALISBURY DAILY TIMES (Md.), Jan. 23, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 
27479481 (“Instead of specifically addressing cell phone use while driving, motorists 
should use common sense and police should enforce negligent driving laws.”). 
 
71 H.B. 380, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008).  The text of this bill is identical to that 
found in House Bill 192, which was drafted in an effort to add reading a text message to 
the list of prohibited activities under § 21-1124.1. H.B. 192, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 
2010). 
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the House of Delegates Environmental Matters Committee 
(“Committee”).72 
 
[23] Numerous organizations, including MedChi, the Maryland 
Department of Transportation, and the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
wrote letters to the Committee voicing their support for the legislation.73  
The State of Maryland Office of the Public Defender, which opined that 
sufficient laws already existed to deal with the dangers associated with 
text messaging while driving, was the only party to oppose the 
legislation.74  The Office of the Public Defender further asserted that if the 
legislature passed the bill, “it [would] need to create a new law for the 
driver who shaves on the way to work or who puts on make-up or who 
eats a Big Mac or looks at a map or other navigation device. . . while 
                                                
72 The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee approved the bill six to five, and the full 
Senate approved the bill twenty-six to twenty-one.  Legislative Digest, BALT. SUN, Mar. 
21, 2008, at 7B; Laura Smitherman & Nick Madigan, Phone Ban Moving Ahead; Bill to 
Prohibit Hand-Held Cells for Md. Motorists Going to Full Senate, BALT. SUN, Mar. 8, 
2008, at 1A; See Bill Info – 2008 Regular Session – HB 380, 
http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rs/ billfile/HB0380.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
 
73 Memorandum from Md. Dep’t of Transp. to H. Envtl. Matters Comm. (Feb. 12, 2008) 
(on file with author); Memorandum from Joseph A. Schwartz, III et al., Am. Acad. of 
Pediatrics, to Hon. Maggie McIntosh, Chairman, H. Envtl. Matters Comm. et al. (Feb. 12, 
2008) (on file with author); Memorandum from Joseph A. Schwartz, III et al., MedChi, to 
Hon. Maggie McIntosh, Chairman, H. Envtl. Matters Comm. et al. (Feb. 12, 2008) (on 
file with author). 
 
74 Position on Proposed Legislation, supra note 67.  See generally Jacobson, supra note 
22, at 1420 (“[T]here are additional likely sources of driver distraction, such as eating, 
drinking, smoking, reading, and grooming, that extant law does not directly target.”); 
Matthew C. Kalin, The 411 on Cellular Phone Use: An Analysis of the Legislative 
Attempts to Regulate Cellular Phone Use by Drivers, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 233, 261 
(“[C]ritics note there are a myriad of activities in a car that are far more distracting—such 
as eating and shaving—yet do not receive the same public attention as cellular phones.”); 
Wallin, supra note 32, at 188 (noting that “those who single out and legislate this action 
ignore the various other types of distracted driving that occur on the roads and highways 
every day.”); Diamondback Editorial Bd., Celling Ourselves Short, DIAMONDBACK (Mar. 
25, 2010), available at http://www.diamondbackonline.com/opinion/staff-editorial-
celling-ourselves-short-1.1281738 (“After all, statistics also show drivers are distracted 
by conversations with passengers – should we ban them too?  What about radios?  Should 
drivers not be allowed to drink a cup of coffee in the morning either?”). 
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driving.”75  Still further, the Office of the Public Defender argued that 
allowing law enforcement officers to pull drivers over for such acts 
“expands the police powers and provides even more of a pretextual reason 
to stop a moving vehicle than allowed under the Maryland Bill of 
Rights.”76  
 
[24] Despite overwhelming support from outside parties, House Bill 
380 ultimately received an unfavorable report from the Committee and 
never proceeded to a vote.77  One Senator who spoke out against the 
legislation argued that “[i]t’s legislating common sense . . . .People should 
be responsible adults and know how to behave and act reasonably.  Next 
we’re going to be telling people what radio station they can listen to and 
how loud they can listen to it.”78  Another delegate called the bill “a 
dropped call,” arguing that “cell phone use is just one of a number of 
driver distractions, and that the bill doesn’t really deal with the larger 
problem.”79  Going even further, another delegate suggested that such 
legislation would create more havoc on the roads, as motorists would 
likely swerve off the road to answer phone calls.80 Supporting the 
legislators’ statements is a paucity of evidence that bans enacted in other 
states have reduced traffic accidents.81   
                                                
75 Position on Proposed Legislation, supra note 67. 
 
76 Id.; see infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the distinction between primary and secondary 
offenses). 
 
77 See Bill Info – 2008 Regular Session – HB 380, http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rs/ 
billfile/HB0380.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). 
 
78 Wallin, supra note 32, at 191-92 (quoting Rep. John Stahl). 
 
79 See Timothy B. Wheeler, Cell Phone Bill Meets Static House Panel Split on Move to 
Limit Drivers’ Cell Use, BALT. SUN, Mar. 26, 2008, at 4B (quoting Anthony J. 
O’Donnell). 
 
80 Id. (citing Del. James E. Malone). 
 
81 See Jacobson, supra note 22, at 1419 (“[N]o significant reductions in traffic crashes 
[were found] in states that enacted handheld cellular phone bans relative to states that had 
not.”); Wallin, supra note 32, at 190-91 (discussing the unanswered questions about the 
effectiveness of legislation banning cell phone use while driving); Cheryl Jensen, Results 
of Study on Cellphone Use Surprise Researchers, WHEELS (Jan. 29, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
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C. 2009 Legislation 
 
[25] After achieving success in one of the legislative chambers in 2008, 
2009 saw Maryland legislators renew their efforts to pass legislation 
outlawing text messaging while driving.82 Ultimately, the legislature 
succeeded and legislation banning text messaging while driving was 
codified in § 21-1124.1 of the Transportation Article.83 
 
1. The 2009 Bills 
 
[26] In 2009 the Senate introduced Senate Bill 98, and the House of 
Delegates introduced House Bill 72.84  House Bill 72 provides that “a 
person may not use a text messaging device to write or send a text 
message while operating a motor vehicle in motion or in the travel portion 
of the roadway.”85  Under this language, the law does not prohibit one 
from reading text messages while driving, and it does not differentiate 
between one driving on the highway and one stopped at a red light.86  Nor 
                                                
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/study-finds-that-reduced-phone-use-does-
not-cut-crashes/ (concluding that laws prohibiting cell phone use while driving have 
failed to reduce the incidence of traffic accidents). 
 
82 Laura Smitherman, Texting-Ban Bill Advances in State Senate, General Assembly 
2009, BALT. SUN, Mar. 14, 2009, at 2A. 
 
83 MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
 
84 See Bill Info – 2009 Regular Session – SB 98, http://mlis.state.md.us/2009RS/ 
billfile/sb0098.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010); Bill Info – 2009 Regular Session – HB 
72, http://mlis.state.md.us/2009RS/billfile/hb0072.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). The 
bills are substantially similar.  See S.B. 98, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009) available 
at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/bills/sb/sb0098e.pdf; H.B. 72, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. 
(Md. 2009) available at http://mlis.state.md.us/ 2009rs/bills/hb/hb0072t.pdf. 
 
85 H.B. 72, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009) available at http://mlis.state.md.us/ 
2009rs/bills/hb/hb0072t.pdf. 
 
86 See id. 
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does the law prohibit the use of a global positioning system (“GPS”) or 
text messaging device to contact 9-1-1.87 
 
[27] The 2009 Senate and House bills received overwhelming support 
from outside parties, including the Maryland Department of 
Transportation,88 MedChi,89 the American Academy of Pediatrics,90 the 
Maryland Sheriff’s Association,91 the Maryland PTA,92 the Maryland 
Chiefs of Police Association,93 and the Maryland Automobile Insurance 
Fund.94  The only parties opposing the bills were the State of Maryland 
                                                
87 See id.; MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1(C) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 
88 See Memorandum from the Md. Dep’t of Transp. to Envtl. Matters Comm. (Feb. 3, 
2009) (on file with author) (supporting House Bill 72); Memorandum from the Md. Dep’t 
of Transp. to Envtl. Matters Comm. (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file with author) (supporting 
Senate Bill 98). 
 
89 See Memorandum from Joseph a. Schwartz, III et al., MedChi, to Hon. Maggie 
McIntosh, Chairman, H. Envtl. Matters Comm. et al. (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file with 
author) (supporting Senate Bill 98). 
 
90 See Memorandum from Joseph A. Schwartz, III et al., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, to Hon. 
Maggie McIntosh, Chairman, H. Envtl. Matters Comm. et al. (Feb. 3, 2009) (on file with 
author) (supporting House Bill 72); Memorandum from Joseph A. Schwartz, III et al., 
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, to Hon. Maggie McIntosh, Chairman, H. Envtl. Matters Comm. 
et al. (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file with author) (supporting Senate Bill 98). 
 
91 See Memorandum from Michael A. Jackson, Chairman, Md. Sheriffs’ Ass’n 
Legislative Comm., and Michael F.  Canning, Exec. Dir., Md. Sheriffs’ Ass’n Legislative 
Comm., to Hon. Maggie L. McIntosh, Chairman, Envtl.  Matters Comm., and Members, 
H. Envtl. Matters Comm. (Feb. 3, 2009) (on file with author) (supporting House Bill 72). 
 
92 See Memorandum from Debbie Ritchie, President, Md. PTA, and Laura Carr, Vice 
President of Legislation, Md. PTA, to Envtl. Matters Comm., (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file 
with author) (supporting Senate Bill 98). 
 
93 See Memorandum from Md. Chiefs of Police Ass’n Legislative Comm. to Envtl. 
Matters Comm. (Feb. 3, 2009) (on file with author) (supporting House Bill 72). 
 
94 See Memorandum from M. Kent Krabbe, Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, to Hon. Maggie L. 
McIntosh, Chairman, Envtl.  Matters Comm., et al. (Mar. 5, 2009) (on file with author) 
(supporting House Bill 72). 
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Office of the Public Defender, which presented the same arguments as it 
did in 2008,95 and the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), which, 
due to concerns of racial profiling on Maryland’s roadways, sought an 
amendment clarifying that the law was a secondary offense and thus could 
not of its own accord justify police detention of a suspect.96 
 
[28] Ultimately, the proposed legislation passed in the House of 
Delegates by a 133-2 margin and in the Senate by a 43-4 margin.97  
Governor Martin O’Malley signed off on the legislation on May 7, 2009, 
and it went into effect on October 1, 2009.98  The law, as currently 
codified, reads:  
 
(a)(1) In this section the following words have the 
meanings indicated. 
 
(2) “9-1-1 system” has the meaning stated in § 1-301 of the 
Public Safety Article. 
 
(3) “Text messaging device” means a hand held device 
used to send a text message or an electronic message via a 
short message service, wireless telephone service, or 
electronic communication network . . . 
 
(b) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, a person may 
not use a text messaging device to write or send a text 
                                                
95 See State of Md. Office of the Pub. Defender, Position on Proposed Legislation – HB 
72 (Feb. 3, 2009) (on file with author) (opposing House Bill 72); State of Md. Office of 
the Pub. Defender, Position on Proposed Legislation – SB 98 (Mar. 31, 2009) (on file 
with author) (opposing Senate Bill 98).  See generally supra note 67 and accompanying 
text. 
 
96 ACLU, Testimony for the House Environmental Matters Committee (Feb. 3, 2009) (on 
file with author).  See generally infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the distinction between 
primary and secondary offenses). 
 
97 Julie Bykowicz, Ban on Texting Passes House, Senate Also Voted to Bar Messaging 
While Driving, BALT. SUN, Apr. 2, 2009, at 1A. 
 
98 See Laura Smitherman, O’Malley Signs Contested Bills, Death Penalty, Driver 
License, Texting Curbs Become Law, BALT. SUN, May 8, 2009, at 3A. 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 1 
 
 20 
message while operating a motor vehicle in motion or in 
the travel portion of the roadway . . . 
 
(c) This section does not apply to the use of: (1) A global 
positioning system; or (2) A text messaging device to 
contact a 9-1-1 system.99 
 
2. Primary v. Secondary Offenses 
 
[29] Text messaging bans for motorists can take the form of:  
 
[E]ither primary or secondary enforcement offenses.  If the 
ban is a primary enforcement offense, the officer may ticket 
a driver . . . without any other traffic offense occurring.  If 
the law only makes the ban a secondary enforcement 
offense, the officer can only ticket the driver if he commits 
some other infraction while breaking the cell phone law.100 
 
[30] In its letter to the Committee, the ACLU noted that the policy 
justification for distinguishing primary and secondary traffic offenses is to 
“protect drivers from pretextual stops.”101  The ACLU, therefore, urged the 
legislature to make the text messaging ban a secondary offense to “ensure 
that the General Assembly does not unwittingly increase the risks of racial 
profiling in traffic stops when addressing the serious problem of distracted 
driving.”102 Echoing this sentiment, a contingent of legislators introduced 
an amendment to the Senate bill that would have made the ban a 
secondary offense; however the amendment failed by a margin of 31-16.103  
As such, the current text messaging ban remains a primary offense, 
                                                
99 MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
 
100 Wallin, supra note 32, at 180.   
 
101 ACLU, supra note 96. 
 
102 Id. 
 
103 See Smitherman, supra note 82.   
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allowing police to initiate traffic stops solely on suspicion of texting while 
driving.104 
 
IV.  NEAR IMPOSSIBLE TO ENFORCE AT BEST,  
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AT WORST 
 
[31] Between the October 1, 2009 effective date and the end of 
February 2010, Maryland law enforcement officers issued only sixty 
citations to motorists for texting while driving.105  In this author’s opinion, 
this minimal number of citations is due to the flaws inherent in the 
legislation: (1) the problems in enforcing the texting ban; and (2) the 
statute’s vague identification of the prohibited behaviors.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
104 See id.  See generally Jacobson, supra note 22, at 1420 (stating that approximately 
“90% of states that ban texting while driving permit primary enforcement.”); Tom 
Precious, Enforcement Key to Law on Young Motorists, New Restrictions Give Parents 
More Responsibility, Clout, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 22, 2010, at A1 (describing the 
secondary-offense feature of New York’s texting ban as a “sizeable loophole”).   
 
105 Julie Bykowicz, Ban on Texting Could Tighten, General Assembly 2010 Session, 
BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2010, at 1A.  In this author’s opinion, the limited number of citations 
to date is especially surprising, considering Maryland’s ban is a primary offense.  See 
supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the distinction between primary and secondary offenses).  
Furthermore, a study of adults from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut revealed 
that eighty-six percent of drivers ignore cell phone bans in their respective states.  Wallin, 
supra note 32, at 191.  See generally James Ewinger, Law Banning Texting While 
Driving May Be Hard to Enforce, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr.  15, 2009, at A1 
(stating that, in the first three months after California banned text messaging while 
driving, law enforcement officers issued only 326 tickets); Juana Summers, Texting-
Driving Bans: Little Effect, Missouri Has Issued 13 Citations in First Five Months; 
Illinois Has No Convictions Since Law Went Into Effect, ST.  LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 
24, 2010, at B1 (noting that, in the first five months after Missouri banned text messaging 
while driving, law enforcement officers issued only thirteen citations); Mark Waller, 
Legislation Would Make Drivers Put Down the Phone, Only Hands-Free Phones Allowed 
Behind the Wheel Under New Bill, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Apr. 26, 2009, at 1 
(explaining that in the first several months after Louisiana banned text messaging while 
driving, law enforcement officers issued “only about 10 tickets under the law”).   
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A.  Enforcement Problems 
 
[32] The 2009 legislation prohibits drivers from either writing or 
sending a text message.106  Assuming, arguendo, it is clear what 
constitutes a text message,107 absent a confession or the confiscation of the 
cell phone in question, it is difficult for a prosecutor to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a driver was writing or sending a text message, as 
opposed to engaging in non-proscribed behavior.108  Thus, Maryland’s 
text-messaging ban is, at best, nearly impossible to enforce.109 
                                                
106 MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1; see Julie Bykowicz, Lawmakers Want to 
Tighten Ban on Texting While Driving, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2010, at 1A; supra note 71 
and accompanying text (detailing the Maryland legislature’s efforts to add reading text 
messages to the list of prohibited activities).   
 
107 But see infra Part IV.B.2 (arguing that it is by no means clear what constitutes a “text 
message”).   
 
108 Absent consent or some other exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement 
officers may not confiscate motorists’ cell phones and search their text messaging history 
without obtaining a search warrant.  See Matthew E.  Orso, Cellular Phones, Warrantless 
Searches, and the New Frontier of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 50 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 183, 191 (2010) (“[C]ourts have regularly held that a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his cellular phone.”); Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, 
Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L. REV. 1165, 1188 
n.145 (2008) (noting a case where the Maryland State’s attorney’s office did not bring 
charges against an individual for possession of a stolen handgun because police searched 
his phone, finding a picture of the gun in a text message, without a search warrant); 
Scharper, supra note 1 (“If a law enforcement officer demands to see my phone, must I 
comply?  No, you have the right to refuse to hand over your phone, unless the officer has 
a search warrant.”).  See generally Katharine M. O’Connor, Note, :o OMG They 
Searched My TXTS: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 685 (2010).   
 
109 See Noder, supra note 30, at 266 (“Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing specific 
types of cell phone and text messaging legislation . . . contributes to the ineffectiveness of 
current legislation.”); Bykowicz, supra note 105 (“But some lawmakers complained last 
year that the measure would be unenforceable . . . .”).  It is important to note that the 
difficulties law enforcement officers encounter in enforcing penal laws do not render the 
statutes unconstitutional.  See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) 
(“What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to 
determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the 
indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.”); Ruark v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 
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1.  Writing 
 
[33] There is undoubtedly a learning curve with respect to the ease and 
efficiency with which one sends a text message, but writing and sending a 
text message is certainly less arduous than taking out a pad of paper to 
compose a written message.110 As such, a law enforcement officer may not 
easily recognize that an individual who is composing a text message is in 
fact engaged in such behavior.111  
 
[34] A significant factor in a police officer’s determination of whether 
an individual is writing a text message while driving is the ability to 
compose and send a text message with either one or two hands.112  The 
                                                
Local Union No. 37, 146 A.2d 797, 800 (Md. 1929) (“[T]he necessity for a fact to be 
proved does not make the fact so in issue indefinite or uncertain.”).   
 
110 Reed, supra note 38, at 4 (“[T]he degree of experience/skill with texting can vary 
considerably between individuals.”).   
 
111 See Bykowicz, supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that the text messaging 
law may be difficult to enforce because “it [is] nearly impossible for a passing officer to 
tell if a driver was reading a message or sending one,” and discussing the relative 
infrequency with which law enforcement officers issue citations for text messaging while 
driving); Robert Salonga, Drivers With Cell Phones Are Back to Old Ways, CONTRA 
COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Nov. 15, 2009, at 18A (noting that it is harder for police to detect 
text messaging than it is for them to detect a violation of a hands-free law). 
 
112 In this author’s experience, composing a text message with one hand more closely 
resembles scrolling through a contact list than drafting a text message.  As such, 
composing a text message with one hand is likely to go undetected.  Furthermore, this 
author’s experiences indicate that detection of one-handed texting would require a law 
enforcement officer to observe a motorist engaged in the act for a substantial amount of 
time – compared to observing a motorist engaged in two-handed texting – before gaining 
the requisite probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. Kevin Landrigan, Texting, Driving 
Bill OK’d, TELEGRAPH (Nashua, N.H.), July 17, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 
13683012 (discussing a New Hampshire bill that makes it illegal “to send a text message 
or to use two hands operating a telecommunications device while driving.”) (emphasis 
added); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:105-a (West, Westlaw through Ch. 55 of 
the 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
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advent of “flip-phones,”113 Blackberrys,114 and iPhones115 has made two-
handed texting much more prevalent than one-handed texting because 
these phones are equipped with a QWERTY keyboard and are more 
conducive to writing with two hands than with one.116 Thus, it is likely that 
a police officer who pulls alongside a motorist holding a cell phone above 
the steering wheel while typing with both thumbs has the requisite 
probable cause to pull the motorist over and cite him for “writing” a text 
message.117 
 
[35] But probable cause to initiate a traffic stop and cite a motorist for 
text messaging while driving is a far cry from proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the motorist was engaged in the criminal act.118  This 
                                                
113 Flip phones look like regular cell phones “until you flip open the lid and expose . . . 
the thumb keyboard . . . .”  Lawrence M. Friedman, Many Happy Returns, 16 CBA REC. 
42, 42 (2002). 
 
114 “A Blackberry is a hand-held device that connects wirelessly to the Internet, providing 
e-mail, phone, and other communications capabilities.”  Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an 
Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its De-evolution for 
American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 85 n.11 (2008).   
 
115 See Apple – iPhone 4, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/messages.html (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2010). One newspaper has reported that “[i]n Maryland, questions have 
been raised about whether it would be illegal to use an iPhone while driving because it 
has a touch screen.”  Jason Nevel, Illinois Legislators Looking to Curb Cell Phone Use in 
Cars, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), Feb. 7, 2009, at A1.  However, in this author’s 
opinion, there is no language in the current statutory scheme prohibiting the mere “use” 
of an iPhone without proof that the user engaged in writing, sending, or reading a text 
message.   
 
116 See Bryan Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of Forum, and 
Network Externalities, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 146 (2009) (noting that the 
QWERTY layout is standard for keyboards).   
 
117 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009) (defining probable cause as “[a] 
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime . . . 
.”). 
 
118 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1949); State v. Catt, 839 So. 2d 
757, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Probable cause is not the same standard as beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . .”); State v. Cabral, 859 A.2d 285, 300 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(noting that beyond a reasonable doubt is a higher standard than probable cause); see also 
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flaw stems from the Maryland legislature’s failure to address the fact that 
individuals use cellular phones for a plethora of activities aside from 
making telephone calls and sending text messages.119  While, perhaps at 
their inception, cell phones were used merely for making telephone calls, 
they “have become combination phone, pager, e-mail server, [I]nternet 
service provider, and planner.”120 
 
[36] Furthermore, several phones like the iPhone121 boast hundreds of 
thousands of apps,122 and the majority of modern cell phones allow users 
to play various games.123  Surely the use of a cell phone for these features 
does not fall under the umbrella of writing a text message.124  Thus, the hill 
prosecutors must climb to prove that those individuals cited for writing a 
text message while driving were indeed engaged in the proscribed 
behavior – to the exclusion of all non-proscribed acts – is steep.  
 
 
                                                
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009) (defining probable cause); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1380 (9th ed. 2009) (defining reasonable doubt). 
 
119 See Ross Chaffin, Comment, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising 
Cost and Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 123 
n.57 (2006). 
 
120 Id.; see Benjamin V. Madison, III, The Elephant in Law School Classrooms: Overuse 
of the Socratic Method as an Obstacle to Teaching Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 293, 296 (2008) (noting that for members of the “Millenial Generation . . 
. . Cellular phones are part of their lives – not just to answer calls whenever they may be 
on the planet, but to take photos, send e-mails, and even to search the Internet.”).   
 
121  See supra note 115. 
 
122 An “app” is “an abbreviation of ‘application,’ which is something you put on your 
iPhone . . . to enable you to do various things with your phone.”  Gertrude Block, 
Language for Lawyers, 57 FED. LAW. 70, 70 (2010).  
 
123 See generally Scharper, supra note 1 (noting the ability to play games on a cell 
phone). 
 
124 See id. (“The law does not ban playing games or using applications.”); Editorial, supra 
note 13 (indicating that under Maryland’s text messaging law it is legal to use 
applications on your iPhone). 
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2.  Sending 
 
[37] The prohibition against sending a text message is an act separate 
and distinct from writing a text message, as statutes are “construe[d] . . . as 
a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered 
surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.”125  The following 
analysis of the act of sending a text message demonstrates that whatever 
difficulties prosecutors have in proving a motorist engaged in writing a 
text message, they are likely to have even more trouble proving a motorist 
was sending a text message. 
 
[38] The act of sending a text message often requires nothing more than 
the simple task of pressing a single button on the cell phone.126  Thus, the 
act of sending a text message takes only a split-second to perform.127  To 
initiate a traffic stop for sending a text message, then, a law enforcement 
officer must have probable cause that a text message is on the cell phone 
screen, and the officer must catch the driver during the split-second when 
he or she is sending the message.128  But, again, having the probable cause 
to initiate a traffic stop and being able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
a motorist was sending a text message are two very different things.129  
Because sending a text message often involves a single keystroke, a 
defendant can argue that he was scrolling through his contacts, dialing a 
telephone number, accessing his calendar, or engaging in any other 
activity with his cell phone that involves a single keystroke and effectively 
establish reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact-finder.130 
 
                                                
125 Green v. Carr Lowery Glass Co., 921 A.2d 235, 241 (Md.  2007).   
 
126 See Mary Beth Marklein, Colleges Catch Cell Phone Wave, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 
2003, at 5D (“With a press of a button, he soon could be sending a text message to the 
cell phones of every student on campus.”).   
 
127 See id.; Goode, supra note 12, at 16 n.66. 
 
128 See supra notes 118, 126-27 and accompanying text. 
 
129 See supra note 118. 
 
130 See supra notes 119-24, 126 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Vagueness 
 
[39] Even if the prosecution can prove a motorist was writing or 
sending something, to sustain a conviction under § 21-1124.1 of the 
Transportation Article, it must still prove the motorist was writing or 
sending a text message within the meaning of the statute.131  But the 
legislature did not define text message, and it is otherwise unclear what 
constitutes a text message.132  As such, § 21-1124.1 is vague at best, and 
unconstitutionally vague at worst. 
 
1.  Vagueness Doctrine in Maryland 
 
[40] Maryland courts have long held that “[a] criminal statute must be 
sufficiently explicit to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to ascertain 
with a fair degree of precision what it prohibits and what conduct on his 
part will render him liable to its penalties, or it will affront the 
constitutional guarantees of due process.”133  A criminal statute is not void 
for vagueness, however, merely “because juries may differ in their 
judgments in cases brought under [the same] facts,”134 or because “the 
statute is of questionable applicability in marginal situations . . . .”135 
                                                
131 See Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). 
 
132 See id. 
 
133 McGowan v. State, 151 A.2d 156, 160 (Md. 1959); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 149 (2007) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)) (“[T]he 
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”); 
MacLeod v.  Takoma Park, 263 A.2d 581, 583 (Md. 1970) (“Due process is violated . . . 
when a statute is so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application.”); Greenwald v. State, 155 A.2d 894, 898 
(Md. 1959) (finding a statute “neither vague nor indefinite [nor an] affront [to] the 
constitutional guarantees of due process . . . . because it is explicit enough to enable a 
person of ordinary intelligence to ascertain with a fair degree of certainty what it 
prohibits and what conduct on the offender’s part will render him liable to its penalties.”). 
 
134 McGowan v. State, 151 A.2d at 160.   
 
135 Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 346 (Md. 1978).   
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[41] A void-for-vagueness analysis is comprised of two criteria, the first 
of which is the fair notice principle, which stems from the notion that 
“[s]ince ‘vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning,’ 
. . . no one should be subject to criminal responsibility for conduct which 
he could not reasonably understand to be prohibited.”136  The second 
criterion is whether the statute “fail[s] to provide legally fixed standards 
and adequate guidelines for police, judicial officers, triers of fact and 
others whose obligation it is to enforce, apply and administer the penal 
laws.”137  Finally, and pertinent to this issue, is the notion that “whenever a 
criminal statute may, because of imprecise draftsmanship, impact upon 
free speech rights, the void-for-vagueness doctrine ‘demands a greater 
degree of specificity than in other contexts.’”138 
 
2. The Vagueness Doctrine and § 21-1124.1 
 
[42] Intuitively, the best advice as to what constitutes a “text message” 
comes from the statutory scheme prohibiting motorists from sending them.  
However, § 21-1124.1 does not define text message.139  Rather, the statute 
defines “text messaging device,” which it deems “a hand held device used 
to send a text message or an electronic message via a short message 
service, wireless telephone service, or electronic communication 
network.”140  Thus, while it would make sense to reason that the definition 
of “text message” should be implicit in the definition of “text messaging 
device,” the legislature, unfortunately, failed to heed an age-old lesson: do 
not use a word to define itself. The legislature’s failure in this respect 
directly contributes to the statute’s inherent vagueness. 
 
                                                
136 State v. Levitt, 426 A.2d 383, 387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (citing Bowers, 389 
A.2d at 341).  
  
137 Id.   
 
138 Bowers, 389 A.2d at 346 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)); see 
infra Part IV.C (discussing the statute’s potential chilling effect on First Amendment 
speech). 
 
139 See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.).   
 
140 Id. 
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[43] What is clear is that the inclusion of the term “text message,” in 
addition to the phrase “an electronic message via a short message service 
[(SMS)],” reveals the legislature’s intent that the term “text messaging 
device” encompass something greater than a device used to send SMS 
messages.141  However, the statute does not outlaw the use of a “text 
messaging device;” rather it outlaws the use of a text messaging device to 
write or send a text message.  Thus, there is no legislative guidance as to 
what constitutes a “text message.” 
 
i.  A “Message” Comprised of “Text” 
 
[44] As Maryland courts have repeatedly stated, “‘[a] dictionary is a 
starting point in the work of statutory construction.’”142  The Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary defines “text” as “the original words and form 
of a written or printed work.”143  Thus, seemingly any letters produced by 
pressing the keys of a cell phone constitute “text.”  The Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary defines “message” as “a communication in writing, 
speech, or by signals.”144  Put together, then, the use of a cell phone to 
communicate in any way meets the dictionary definition of a text message.  
According to this definition, then, the use of a cell phone to post a 
message on Facebook or a tweet on Twitter, in addition to sending an e-
mail or a standard SMS message, constitutes writing a “text message.”  In 
fact, one could argue that any use of a cell phone to access the Internet 
                                                
141 Id.; see Goode, supra note 12, at 16 n.66 (explaining that text messages are typically, 
but not exclusively, sent via SMS).  SMS messages “allow[] a user to send a message 
consisting of a maximum of 160 characters from a cell phone or computer to another cell 
phone.” Alyssa H. DaCunha, TXTS R SAFE 4 2DAY: Quon v. Arch Wireless and the 
Fourth Amendment Applied to Text Messages, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 295, 299 (2009).   
 
142 Bd. of License Comm’rs v. Toye, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (Md. 1999) (quoting Morris v. 
Prince George’s Cnty., 573 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Md. 1990)); see also Bd. of License 
Comm’rs v. Global Exp. Money Orders, Inc., 896 A.2d 432, 437 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2006).   
 
143 Text, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/text (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2010).   
 
144 Message, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/message 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010).  
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constitutes sending a text message, as the Internet is a form of “electronic 
communications network,” and one “communicates” using text whenever 
he accesses the Internet with a cell phone.145  
 
ii.  Common Understanding 
 
[45] While strict dictionary definitions are a “useful starting point,”146 
such definitions “are not dispositive as to the meaning of statutory 
terms,”147 and are “not necessarily the end” of a statutory construction 
analysis.148  A bedrock rule of statutory construction is that courts interpret 
statutory language to conform to its plain meaning; that is, they interpret a 
statute according to the “ordinary and commonly understood meaning” of 
its words.149 
 
[46] The commonly understood meaning of “text message,” however, 
does not nearly encompass the plethora of activities falling within the 
aggregated dictionary definitions of “text” and “message.”150  In common 
parlance, the term “text message” does not include using a cell phone to 
                                                
145 Internet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/internet 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (emphasis added).  Such a reading is in line with another rule 
of statutory construction; namely, that courts define words by looking at how they fit into 
“the context of the statute in light of the setting, the objectives, and the purpose of the 
enactment.” Sabatier v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 1098, 1107 (Md. 1991).  That 
is, in passing the texting legislation, the Maryland legislature sought to deal with the 
problem of “driver inattention,” and one could argue drivers are most inattentive when 
using their cell phones to access the Internet.  See Fiscal and Policy Note – House Bill 72, 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/fnotes/bil_0002/hb0072.pdf. 
 
146 Stachowski v. Sysco Food Servs. of Balt., Inc., 937 A.2d 195, 206 (Md. 2007). 
 
147 Id.  
 
148 Bd. of License Comm’rs v. Toye, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (Md. 1999) (quoting Morris v. 
Prince George’s Cnty., 573 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Md. 1990)). 
 
149 Elder v. Smith, 987 A.2d 36, 41 (Md. 2010) (quoting Addison v. Lochearn Nursing 
Home, LLC, 983 A.2d 138, 153 (Md. 2009)).   
 
150 See supra Part IV.B.2.i.   
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post on Facebook, tweet on Twitter, or even send e-mails.151  Rather, in 
this author’s experience, the term most commonly refers to the sending of 
a message from one cell phone to another.  Whereas the verbs “post” and 
“tweet” refer to Facebook and Twitter posts, respectively, the words “text” 
or “texting” refer to sending messages from one cell phone to another.152  
Such an understanding of the term is consistent with the Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary, which defines “text messaging” as “the sending of 
short text messages electronically especially from one cell phone to 
another.”153  Thus, according to this definition, none of the aforementioned 
activities constitute “text messaging” as none of them involve sending a 
message from one cell phone to another; they entail sending a message 
from a cell phone to an Internet server.   
 
[47] After all of this, what do we know?  The only thing this author can 
say with any degree of confidence is that the term “text message” 
encompasses SMS messages.154  Aside from this limited understanding, 
we have an expansive view of the term stemming from dictionary 
definitions of “text” and “message,” a view at odds with the common 
understanding and usage of the term.155  While the legislature is free to 
word penal statutes “by a general term without definition,” it may only do 
                                                
151 Regarding a 2010 bill prohibiting motorists from merely reading text messages, a state 
legislator noted that “[w]ith features like mapping, social media, e-mail and Web 
browsing, there are too many temptations for drivers when their phones are in front of 
them . . . .”  Bykowicz, supra note 105.  Such a statement permits the inference that the 
legislator does not believe the 2009 bill prohibits the aforementioned activities. 
 
152 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf (last visited Oct. 29, 2010) (“By ‘post’ we 
mean post on Facebook or otherwise make available to us.”); The Twitter Glossary, 
TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/104-welcome-to-
twittersupport/ articles/166337-the-twitter-glossary#t (last visited Oct. 29, 2010) (“Tweet, 
Tweeting, Tweeted. The act of posting a message, often called a ‘Tweet,’ on Twitter.”). 
 
153 Text Messaging, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/text%20messaging (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).   
 
154 See Goode, supra note 12, at 16 n.66 (explaining that text messages are typically, but 
not exclusively, sent via SMS); DaCunha, supra note 141.  
 
155 See supra notes 143-45, 150-53 and accompanying text. 
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so “if the term has a settled common-law meaning and a commonly 
understood meaning which does not leave a person of ordinary 
intelligence in doubt as to its purport .  .  .  .”156  However, “text message” 
does not have a common-law definition, and, as the previous discussion 
reveals, the likely definition of the term would “leave a person of ordinary 
intelligence in doubt as to its purport . . . .”157  
 
[48] It is questionable whether Maryland citizens have fair notice of 
what activity is criminal under § 21-1124.1.158  The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has held that a law survives a vagueness challenge if the citizens 
are “perfectly capable, without having to guess, of understanding [the 
statute’s] meaning and application.”159  Because the statute’s bare text 
messaging statute leaves Maryland citizens, at best, guessing what conduct 
is prohibited, Maryland courts may find it unconstitutionally vague.  
Furthermore, this murkiness fails to provide a fixed standard for police 
officers charged with enforcing the texting ban and judges and juries 
charged with determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.160  
 
3. Vagueness and Other Jurisdictions’ Cell Phone Bans 
  
[49] The argument that a law restricting motorists’ use of cell phones is 
unconstitutional is not without precedent, as such bans “have been the 
subject of constitutional challenges since their inception . . . .”161  For 
instance, legislative efforts in Michigan failed because of fears that such a 
law might restrict privacy rights and personal freedoms, and numerous 
                                                
156 State v. Magaha, 32 A.2d 477, 481 (Md. 1943).   
 
157 Id. 
 
158 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see also MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 
21-1124.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.) (lacking a definition for text 
message). 
 
159 Fogle v. H & G Rest., Inc., 654 A.2d 449, 467 (Md. 1995). 
 
160 The second factor in a void-for-vagueness analysis.  See State v. Levitt, 426 A.2d 383, 
387 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (citing Bowers, 389 A.2d at 341).  
 
161 Wallin, supra note 32, at 186.  
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United States Congressmen expressed concern that laws limiting cell 
phone use might implicate First Amendment freedom of speech rights.162 
 
[50] By way of example, in People v. Neville, the New York Justice 
Court charged a defendant with using a cell phone while operating a motor 
vehicle.163  This was in violation of a New York State statute providing 
that “no person shall operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway while 
using a mobile telephone to engage in a call while such vehicle is in 
motion.”164  The defendant argued, inter alia, that the statute was vague, 
overbroad, and in violation of the New York State and United States 
Constitutions.165  After enunciating a vagueness standard similar to that of 
Maryland,166 the court explained that the statute properly distinguished 
“between the prohibited ‘mobile telephones’ and the permitted ‘hands free 
mobile telephone’ where the operator of the motor vehicle can maintain 
‘both hands’ on the applicable steering device.”167  After noting that the 
statute initially limited police action to a verbal warning, the court 
concluded that the language of the statute was “clear and indisputable to 
                                                
162 Noder, supra note 30, at 248 & n.54.   
 
163 737 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 2002). 
 
164 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c(2)(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2010 (chs. 1-
55, 61-110)); see supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting the Maryland legislature’s 
efforts to pass a similar bill in 2010).   
 
165 Neville, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
 
166 See id. (citing People v. Shack, 658 N.E.2d 706, 712 (N.Y. 1995) (“The first question 
of consideration is if the law is so vague or overly broad to the point where a reasonable 
person of ordinary intelligence would be unable to ascertain what conduct is 
prohibited.”).   
 
167 Id. (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c(1)(e) (McKinney, Westlaw through 
L.2010 (chs. 1-55, 61-110))). 
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the ordinary citizen.”168  Thus, the statute was held to be neither “void for 
vagueness nor overly broad.”169 
 
[51] Of course, § 21-1124.1 of the Transportation Article, as it stands 
today, is distinguishable from the statute with which the Neville court 
dealt.  While some might take issue with a statute outlawing hand-held 
phones for purposes of making a call,170 citizens of New York are on fair 
notice that using a cell phone without a hands-free device while driving is 
a violation of § 1225-c of New York’s Vehicle and Traffic law because 
nothing in the New York statute is vague, overbroad, or ambiguous.171  
But it is unclear what behavior Maryland’s § 21-1124.1 prohibits.  Does it 
apply to e-mail?  Blackberry Messenger?  Cell-phone-based GPS?  
Neither the citizens of Maryland, the law enforcement agencies 
responsible for enforcing the statute, nor the judges and juries charged 
with determining guilt have any guidance.  As such, application of the 
New York court’s holding in Neville to the Maryland statute would be 
misplaced. 
 
C.  Chilling Effect 
 
[52] The vagueness doctrine is inextricably linked with the chilling 
effect vague statutes exert on non-proscribed behaviors.172  As the Court of 
                                                
168 Id.  The court believed that the legislature provided a one-month warning period “[a]s 
an added concern for public knowledge and understanding of the law . . . .”  Id. 
 
169 Id.; see also Schor v. Daley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 893, 904-05 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding 
that an ordinance of the City of Chicago, which prohibited the use of a mobile telephone 
while operating a motor vehicle, was not void for vagueness).   
 
170 See generally Jensen, supra note 81 (describing a study that concluded laws outlawing 
cell phone use while driving failed to reduce the incidence of traffic accidents). 
 
171 See Neville, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
 
172 See, e.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 689 n.3 (1972) (noting that a statute is 
void for vagueness where “the common meaning of its words is so imprecise . . . as to 
place a ‘chilling effect’ upon constitutionally protected expression”); Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967) (noting the Supreme Court’s “overriding duty to 
insulate all individuals from the ‘chilling effect’ upon exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms generated by vagueness .  .  . .”).    
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Appeals of Maryland noted, “the Supreme Court has stated that whenever 
a criminal statute may, because of imprecise craftsmanship, impact upon 
free speech rights, the void-for-vagueness doctrine ‘demands a greater 
degree of specificity than in other contexts.’”173  As such, because the 
vagueness of Maryland’s statute might cause motorists to abstain from 
First Amendment behaviors otherwise permissible under § 21.1124.1, the 
likelihood of the chilling effect is high.   
 
[53] It should be undisputed that the behaviors that potentially 
constitute sending a text message – SMS texting, e-mailing, messaging on 
Blackberry Messenger, posting on Facebook or Twitter, etc.  – are forms 
of speech subject to protection by the Maryland Declaration of Rights and 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.174  This is 
evidenced by Maryland courts’ long-standing holding that “[i]t is the 
substance rather than the form of communication to which the First 
Amendment protection attaches. . . .”175  Thus, whether the protected 
expression is an individual voicing his opinion on a street corner, or an 
individual posting to a Facebook wall or Twitter account via cell phone, 
the expression is entitled to protection.   
 
[54]  It is of note that the freedom of speech is not an unlimited and 
unqualified right, and courts will uphold a statute challenged on First 
Amendment grounds “if it furthers an important or substantial government 
interest.”176  While this is true – and certainly, the Maryland legislature 
                                                
173 Bowers, 389 A.2d at 346 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 573). 
 
174 The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, “that every citizen of the State ought to 
be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects.” MD. CONST., 
DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 40; see also Runnels v. Newell, 944 A.2d 1183, 1208 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2008) (noting that the rights available under the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights are the same as those protected by the First Amendment).  The First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
 
175 Luthardt v. State, 251 A.2d 40, 44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969).   
 
176 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); accord State v. Sheldon, 629 
A.2d 753, 758 (Md. 1993).   
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sought to further an important and substantial government interest with 
this legislation – it is the legislature’s responsibility to enact a well-drafted 
statute.177  Where the legislature fails in that endeavor, the courts must be 
careful not to construe the statute too broadly simply because of a well-
intended and worthwhile legislative purpose.178  
 
[55] After understanding the inherent vagueness of § 21-1124.1, 
grasping the mechanics of the chilling effect as it relates to the texting 
statute is relatively simple.179  It is this author’s opinion that a fair 
construction of the statute prohibits the sending of SMS and similar 
phone-to-phone messages.  However, the average citizen, upon reading 
that the writing or sending of text messages is prohibited, could reasonably 
conclude that writing or sending any messages comprised of text is 
prohibited.180  As such, citizens will likely refrain from permissible 
activities, including e-mailing and posting on a Facebook wall or Twitter 
account.  This result, while perhaps making Maryland’s roadways safer, is 
actually the result of the chilling effect on otherwise protected speech 
stemming from this poorly drafted and vague statute.181  Thus, § 21-1124.1 
not only fails to provide citizens with fair notice of what constitutes 
prohibited conduct, but it threatens to prevent citizens from engaging in 
otherwise non-proscribed speech. 
 
V.  REASON FOR HOPE: NEW LEGISLATION 
  
[56] During the 2010 legislative session, the Maryland legislature 
introduced House Bill 385, which would have remedied many of the 
aforementioned ills of the current legislation.182  This bill would have 
                                                
177 See Taylor v. Nationsbank, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (Md. 2001). 
 
178 See id. 
 
179 See supra Parts IV.B. and C. 
 
180 See supra Part IV.B. 
 
181 See supra Part IV.C. 
 
182 Smartphone Safety Act, H.B. 385, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010), available at 
http://mlis.state.md.us/2010rs /bills/hb/hb0385f.pdf. 
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provided a more useful and effective text-messaging prohibition, from 
both an enforcement and constitutional perspective.  The text of the 
proposed bill dictated that:  
 
[A] person, while operating a motor vehicle that is in 
motion, may not use a wireless communication device to: 
(1) type, send or read an electronic message, including a 
text message; (2) search for or read content on the Internet; 
(3) access or update social networking websites; (4) takes 
photographs; (5) play video games; (6) download any 
content; (7) view any video content; or (8) engage in any 
other use of a wireless communication device not explicitly 
authorized.183 
 
Unfortunately for Maryland citizens, this bill was not even taken to vote 
by the House Environmental Matters Committee, let alone adopted to 
amend the law.184 
 
[57] Regarding enforcement, the main problem with the current 
legislation is the difficulty law enforcement personnel and prosecutors 
have proving a motorist engaged in the narrow class of acts constituting 
writing or sending a text message.185  However, House Bill 385, proposed 
to repeal and reenact § 21-1124.1 in its current form, the class of 
proscribed behavior would be widened considerably, with only a few 
circumstances in which a motorist may operate a wireless communication 
device.186  As such, the bill provides law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors additional weapons in their repertoire from which they may 
successfully prosecute motorists who violate the statute.187  In fact, this 
                                                
183 Id. 
 
184 See H. Envtl. Matters Comm., Voting Record, H.B. 385, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 
2010), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2010rs/votes_comm/hb0385_env.pdf. 
 
185 See supra Part IV.A.   
 
186 H.B. 385, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010).     
 
187 H.B. 385, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010). 
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expanded list of acts in which motorists may not longer engage is in line 
with the legislative purpose underlying § 21-1124.1: combating driver 
inattention.188 
 
[58] More importantly, passing a bill similar to House Bill 385 would 
help cure the vagueness plaguing the current legislation.  Because the term 
“text message” has a very specific and limited colloquial meaning under 
House Bill 385 – an SMS text message – reviewing courts will, of course, 
utilize this meaning to determine what constitutes a text message.189  But, 
by precluding motorists from “typ[ing], send[ing], or read[ing] an 
electronic message, including text messages,” the legislation would clearly 
identify the parameters of prohibited behavior.190  This language not only 
prohibits “text messages” as they are commonly understood, but any form 
of electronic message.  As such, the legislation would provide Maryland 
citizens with fair notice that they are susceptible to criminal liability if 
they send any form of electronic message while driving.191  To provide 
further clarity, the legislation should explicitly enumerate which behaviors 
are prohibited and which behaviors are allowed.  This would put Maryland 
citizens in the best position to understand which behaviors lead to a 
misdemeanor citation.192  Finally, compared to legislation outlawing 
merely the writing or sending of text messages, the use of the term 
“electronic message,” as seen in proposed House Bill 385, provides law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges, with a workable, 
straightforward standard to apply in enforcing and prosecuting the law.193 
 
                                                
188 See Fiscal and Policy Note – House Bill 72, available at 
http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/fnotes/bil_0002/ hb0072.pdf. 
 
189 Because House Bill 385 sets forth an enumerated list of proscribed behavior, the 
inference may drawn that the term text message is limited to SMS messages. H.B. 385, 
2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010). 
 
190 H.B. 385, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md.  2010) (emphasis added).   
 
191 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 
192 See generally supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text. 
 
193 See generally supra notes 137 and accompanying text. 
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[59] House Bill 385 would likely serve as an analog to the statute 
reviewed in People v.  Neville.194  That is, the statute in Neville was a 
catchall statute prohibiting motorists from “using a mobile telephone to 
engage in a call while such vehicle is in motion.”195  Similarly, House Bill 
385 prohibits motorists from “engag[ing] in any other use of a wireless 
communication device not explicitly authorized.”196  And just as the New 
York court determined its statute was not vague or overbroad,197 Maryland 
courts would likely reach a similar conclusion with respect to proposed 
House Bill 385. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[60] Because cell phones have become an integral component of global 
culture, “drivers mistakenly assume they can be used safely while 
operating a motor vehicle.”198  But the reality is that distracted drivers pose 
a serious hazard toward other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians alike.199  
The ideal solution to curtail distracted driving is likely one involving 
“concerted action at every level of government” – action combining 
legislation, education, and possibly manufacturer design changes.200  
However, it is ultimately up to “[s]ociety and legislatures [to] decide the 
appropriate scope of cell phone legislation.”201  Certainly, bans on texting 
while driving are no exception.202 
                                                
194 See generally 737 N.Y.S.2d 251. 
 
195 See id. at 254 (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c(2)(a) (McKinney, Westlaw 
through L.2010 (chs. 1-55, 61-110))). 
 
196 Smartphone Safety Act, H.B. 385, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010), available at 
http://mlis.state.md.us/ 2010rs/bills/hb/hb0385f.pdf. 
 
197 Neville, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 254. 
 
198 Jacobson, supra note 22, at 1419.   
 
199 See id.  (“The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reported that 
5870 persons died (16% of all fatalities) and an estimated 515,000 individuals were 
injured in police-reported crashes involving driver distraction in 2009.”). 
 
200 Id. at 1419-20.   
 
201 Kalin, supra note 74, at 262. 
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[61] In passing Transportation Article § 21-1124.1, the Maryland 
legislature was derelict with its onus to combat distracted driving vis-à-vis 
text messaging.  While courts are at liberty to analyze and construe 
ambiguous statutes – “[i]t is one of the principal functions which courts 
were created to perform”203 – some statutes are so ambiguous and 
unworkable that courts should declare them void for vagueness.   
 
[62] Legislators passed § 21-1124.1 to show their constituents they 
were doing their part to make Maryland’s roads safer.204  But this statute 
engenders nothing more than a false sense of security, has the potential to 
hinder future legislative efforts to combat texting while driving and is 
likely impossible to enforce.205  Its invocation of the term text message to 
define prohibited conduct deprives Maryland citizens of fair notice as to 
what conduct is criminal and forces law enforcement officers, prosecutors, 
and judges to apply an unworkable standard.206  To cure these ills 
Maryland legislators should enact House Bill 385, which unequivocally 
informs citizens, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges of the 
prohibited conduct.  Only then will Maryland’s citizens stop TXTing207 
                                                
 
202 See id.  But see Wallin, supra note 32, at 177 (arguing in its title that a “Legislative 
Ban is Not The Answer”). 
   
203 Mangum v. Md. State Bd. of Censors, 328 A.2d 283, 292 (Md. 1974). 
   
204 See Michael Dresser, Cell Phone Curb Begins, BALT. SUN, May 22, 2009, at 1A 
(quoting Governor Martin O’Malley as saying, “This legislative session, we passed tough 
new laws to improve safety on our roadways by cracking down on drunken driving, 
speeding and texting.”). 
 
205 See supra Part IV.A. 
 
206 See supra Part IV.B. 
 
207 TXT stands for “Text.”  See Definition of TXT, ONLINE SLANG DICTIONARY, 
http://onlineslangdictionary.com/ definition+of/txt (last visited Oct. 29, 2010); Mark 
Henderson, A Race to the Wire as Old Hand at Morse Code Beats Txt Msgrs, THE TIMES, 
(April 16, 2005) available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/ 
article381748.ece.  
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and tell their friends that they GTG208 when getting behind the wheel of a 
car.   
                                                
208 See Texting Teens Get Message, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, at W1, (Jul. 15, 2010) (“GTG is 
a texting acronym that stands for ‘got to go.’”). 
 
